Bloody Sunday was planned - new evidence
By Laura Friel
Bloody Sunday was the result of a planned attack by the British
army in Derry which British soldiers knew in advance would result
in civilian casualties, according to new evidence. A number of
witnesses have recently come forward for the first time to make
statements to lawyers who are compiling evidence.
The witnesses have said they were warned by British soldiers with
whom they were friendly to stay away from the march because their
lives would be in danger.
In a sworn affidavit, one female witness said she was told by a
high ranking officer in the British army to keep her family away
from the march because ``this is going to be one bloody Sunday''.
Her testimony corroborates a statement by a British paratrooper,
known only as Soldier A, who admitted during a Channel Four
documentary last year that he and his colleagues were told the
night before the march that they were ``going to Londonderry to
get some kills''.
A solicitor working on the case for the forthcoming inquiry has
said the material indicates a ``frightening picture of pre-planned
murder''.
In addition, a document compiled in the immediate aftermath of
Bloody Sunday by two investigative journalists, which was never
printed and had subsequently gone `missing', has unexpectedly
surfaced amongst the archives of the National Council for Civil
Liberties. Derek Humphry and Murray Sayle were dispatched to
Derry by The Sunday Times immediately after Bloody Sunday.
After gathering ``at least one hundred pieces of evidence'' which
included eyewitness accounts, interviews with survivors, tape
recordings and indirect contact with the IRA, Sayle and Humphry
filed their 10 page copy. The article never appeared in print.
Harold Evans, the editor, handed the unpublished document to the
Widgery Inquiry after which it effectively vanished for 26 years.
Last month extracts appeared in the Derry magazine `Fingerpost'
reproduced by Dessie Baker.
The article contends that the then British PM Edward Heath and
Brian Faulkner had accepted British Military Intelligence claims
that the IRA were beaten in Belfast and a decisive blow in Derry
would finish them off. ``The idea,'' wrote Sayle and Humphry,
``worked out, we believe, by Lieut-Colonel Derek Wilford on lines
of thinking propounded by Brigadier Frank Kitson, British army
counter-insurgency, was based on the military principle that the
way to bring your enemy to battle is to attack something that,
for prestige reasons he will have to defend...he will then be
annihilated by superior strength. The Civil Rights march, the
Parachute Regiment planners believed, was just such an objective
which the IRA would have to defend or lose its popular support in
the Bogside - either way the IRA would be finished.''
From eyewitness accounts, Sayle and Humphry describe the
operation as it was played out on the ground. ``The saracens took
up rehearsed blocking positions along Rossville Street and next
to Rossville flats. Paratroopers wearing combat, and not
anti-riot, gear jumped out and dropped into standard British army
firing positions in spots clearly selected in advance for the
purpose of the operation.'' This style of operation would be in
keeping with their role as frontline assault troops. As Murray
Sayle points out, ``this was a pre-planned operation. Parachutists
specialise in them. They seldom have what are called `encounter
battles' - when two groups just run into each other. Paras have a
plan which they initiate the moment they hit the ground jumping
either from aircraft or in this case pigs/Saracens.''
Sayle and Humphry conclude that Bloody Sunday was the result of a
special operation by the British Paratroop regiment ``which went
disastrously wrong''.
If Sayle and Humphry are correct, civilian casualties were an
integral part of the military's strategy. The ``disaster'' for the
British army was the failure of the killings to draw the IRA into
an armed confrontation. Undoubtedly, the British army intended to
use the confusion of an ensuing gun battle - in which they hoped
to kill IRA Volunteers - to cover up their prior cold blooded
murder of civilians. In the event the British army, in failing to
engage armed IRA Volunteers, were left with unarmed dead and
injured civilians to explain away.
Sayle and Humphry's analysis suggests that victims of Bloody
Sunday were not targeted in the ``mistaken'' belief that they were
armed IRA Volunteers - this is confirmed by the detail of many of
their deaths - but expendable pawns in a British army counter
insurgency game plan.
It is significant, says Sayle, that the Widgery inquiry was into
only ``what happened in Derry from 2pm on Sunday''. ``The plan was
not to be revealed or even discussed,'' concludes Sayle. The
soldiers who fired the shots, the British officers who ordered
them, the military strategists who drew up the plan, their
political masters who sanctioned it, and those who colluded in
the ensuing cover up are clearly all culpable.
Meanwhile relatives of Jim Wray, one of thirteen people killed on
Bloody Sunday, have informed the chairperson of the new inquiry,
British Law Lord Mark Saville, that they have no confidence in
the hearing. In a letter, Liam Wray, brother of the dead man,
said he did not believe the parameters of the new inquiry met the
basic requirements ``to obtain truth and justice''. The family's
main objection is on the issue of immunity. The possibility of
some people being granted immunity was a ``diminution of justice''
and no guarantee of the truth being revealed, writes Liam. The
inquiry is expected to begin in the autumn and last at least a
year. While many of the relatives have reservations they have
decided to suspend judgement until the full scope of the inquiry
is known. In the interests of truth and reconciliation, all those
involved in the massacre should come forward and participate
fully in the forthcoming inquiry.