Where election fever can be fatal
US foreign policy interests determine which elections are valid
By Dara MacNeil
As part of its campaign to destabilise Sandinista Nicaragua in
the 1980s, the United States repeatedly called on the country's
leaders to hold what they termed ``free and fair elections.''
In 1984, the Sandinistas did just that and secured an
overwhelming victory at the polls - winning some 70% of all votes
cast. International observers, including a number from this
country, unanimously declared that the elections had indeed met
the criteria established by the US and had been ``free and fair.''
Alone in the international community, the US ignored the result
and in an act of stunning audacity its government actually
pretended that no elections had taken place at all. Successive US
administrations continued to refer to Nicaragua's democratically
elected government as a ``junta.''
However in 1990, the US achieved the result it wanted when the
Sandinistas were ousted by the US-financed UNO coalition.
Predictably, the result was duly recognised and the election
hailed as a `triumph for democracy'. To this day history, as
recorded by the White House and its acolytes, deems that nothing
of significance took place in Nicaragua prior to 1990.
Similarly, the US claims that its opposition to the Cuban regime
is rooted, not in ideology, but in that country's failure to hold
``free and fair'' elections. Repeatedly, they stress that the
outcome of any such election would be respected by Washington.
With one major exception. Current US law states that should Cuba
comply with US wishes and hold such an election tomorrow, and
should it be won by either Fidel or Raul Castro, such an outcome
would not be recognised as ``free and fair.'' It would, like the
Nicaraguan experience, become an election that never was.
However such democratic concerns do not arise in the case of
Indonesia. A valued western ally strategically-located in South
East Asia, the country has also proved a lucrative location for
Western investors.
Apart from having the worst human rights record in the post-war
world, Indonesia is also a functioning dictatorship, headed by
the notoriously bloodthirsty General Suharto. The General came to
power in a 1965 coup which was accompanied by the slaughter of
500,000 Indonesians, many of whom were members - or suspected
members - of the country's communist party. The CIA provided
Suharto with much of the information he required to carry out his
purge. A former CIA operative has talked about ``the steps the
agency (CIA) took to create the conditions that led to the
massacre of at least half a million Indonesians.''
Indonesia, however, does hold elections. Of a sort. Thus, since
1965 General Suharto has never once been defeated by an
opposition candidate for the post of President. Supporters of the
old dictator - such as his admirers in the West - cite this fact
as an illustration of Suharto's enduring popularity among his
people.
Equally, in defence of the regime, they point to other examples
of functioning Indonesian democracy, such as the regular
elections for the country's parliament, the most recent of which
concluded at the end of May.
Here, Suharto's ruling Golkar Party won an estimated 74% of the
vote and, according to media reports ``crushed the opposition.''
Golkar was reported to have increased its share of the vote by 6%
over its 1992 showing. Even Golkar deputies, media reports
assured us, were surprised by their party's strong showing.
However, they failed to mention a number of salient points about
the Indonesian electoral system. For example, opposition parties
are strictly regulated by law and none can exist without the
assent of General Suharto.
They also need his endorsement to contest elections. A similar
system applies to Presidential elections, with the regime
carefully picking candidates to `challenge' General Suharto.
Indonesia's jails are filled with those who are at variance with
his concept of democracy.
As a result, the Indonesian `opposition' is both created and
maintained by the regime. Its function (as determined by Suharto)
is to simply add an electoral, legitimising gloss to a system of
dictatorship. The existence of a loyal opposition also helps
forestall criticism from human rights groups and their ilk.
In addition, the country's 500 seat parliament does not actually
have the power to do anything but consent to Presidential
decisions and decrees. Last year, the regime engineered the
removal of Megawati Sukarnoputri as head of the
officially-approved `opposition' Indonesian Democratic Party.
It appears Sukarnoputri took her role as an `opposition' leader a
little more seriously than the government intended.
However, even with the odds stacked in its favour the regime is
not averse to a little cheating in order to ensure the desired
result. A report on the May elections concluded they had been
marked by ``systematic violations'', including multiple voting,
intimidation and procedural irregularities.
Meanwhile, as this farce was being played out, with not a hint of
criticism from the Western champions of democracy, the true face
of the Indonesian regime was revealed in neighbouring, occupied
East Timor. As the votes were still being counted, Indonesian
troops rounded up dozens of young East Timorese, following a
rebel attack which left four Indonesian soldiers dead. By way of
reprisal, the soldiers executed 16 young people - four for every
soldier killed. Thus far, democracy Indonesian-style has failed
to attract even a tiny proportion of the odium heaped upon either
Nicaragua or Cuba.